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PRIVATE LIBEL OR PUBLIC EXHORTATION
INTRODUCTION
Some of the things we treasure most in our American
democratic society contain the seeds of peril. Thomas
Jefferson considered the principal evil of popular govern-
ment "the turbulence to which it is subject."' This turbu-
lence is inherent in what he has called "the boisterous sea
of liberty."2
Recently an editorial writer of a large metropolitan
newspaper related this problem to newspapers in this
manner: "'You can't have free speech without some noisy
people; you can't have a free press without what many
people would consider some reprehensible newspapers....
There is no way to have either without losing freedom
itself.' "
Much of the criticism directed at newspapers stems from
failure to distinguish the noisy from the quiet ones, the
reprehensible from the praiseworthy. In this the pattern is
the same which Jefferson considered inherent in our
democratic government. Yet he saw less peril in it than in
tranquil servitude." And despite the tendency towards
maturity and stabilization which a century and a half of
national life has produced, the development of modern
1 TBE WRmINS OF THOmAS JE FmsoN, Vol. VI, p. 65 (1903), (Letter to
James Madison, Jan. 30, 1787).
2 TE WRnNGS or THOmAS JEFRSON, Vol. XV, p. 283 (1904), (Letter to
Richard Rush, Oct. 20, 1820): "Nor is our side of the water entirely un-
troubled, the boisterous sea of liberty is never without a wave."
3 Carl R. Kesler as quoted in EDITOR AND PUBLISERM, Vol. 87, No. 28 at
p. 12 (July 3, 1954).
4 Supra note 1.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
newspaper techniques and new media of communication,
such as radio and television, have made it possible for the
strident voice to overshadow the restrained one, or appear
to do so. Nevertheless, a fair appraisal of the situation
would indicate that the newspapers of today are, in the
main, performing their function in our democratic society
in good tradition. It is the object of this study to point to
some of the rights of the newspapers and the value to the
community of their proper exercise.
I
NEWSPAPER RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
Jefferson was so convinced of the indispensability of the
newspaper to democratic society that he once wrote that if
given the choice between a government without a news-
paper or newspapers without a government, he would
choose the latter.* The right to gather and disseminate
information and to comment on what goes on about us
belongs to the newspaper publisher as an individual and
not in his capacity as a newspaper man. He exercises a right
which belongs to every citizen, be he newspaper publisher
or not. Indeed, one of California's court of appeals ex-
pressed it in this manner: "The law recognizes no special
privilege in a newspaper. The privilege of a newspaper is in
nowise different from that of any citizen of the commu-
nity."' This principle is not new. It has been expressed in
5 Op. cit. supra note 2 Vol. VI at 57-58, (Letter to Edward Carrington,
Jan. 16, 1787): "The basis of our governments being the opinion of people,
the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or news-
papers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers, and
be capable of reading them."
6 Morcom v. San Francisco Shopping News, 4 Cal. App.2d 284, 287
(1935).
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many cases, old and new, in California and elsewhere.'
A West Virginia court has stated it in one sentence:
"Any person has the same right as a publisher of a news-
paper."' So when we speak of "the rights and privileges"
of newspapers and hear charges of their abuse, we are,
in reality, discussing the rights and privileges of all of us
and their possible abuse in democratic society. So, we are
back to the "turbulence" of which Jefferson spoke.
The problem still is, how should this function be per-
formed? There are those who would, by dilution of our
constitutional safeguards, impose censorship in one form
or another. Others would, in indirect fashion, regulate the
contents of newspapers or limit their method or manner
of distribution. Leaving aside any constitutional con-
siderations, I am of the view that the limitations imposed
on the newspapers by the law of defamation and the rules
evolved by the courts in interpreting statutory definitions
of libel are sufficient to insure protection against the
abuses of sensational newspapers using reprehensible
methods.
It is not my object to discuss in detail the limitations
upon the exercise of freedom of expression which the law
of defamation, the law of privacy and the law of contempt
impose upon newspapers.9 Rather shall I point to some of
these rights and the manner of exercising them which
7 An old California case, Tanner v. Embree, 9 Cal. App. 481, 484 (1908),
although expressing some doctrines now repudiated, said correctly in this
respect: "In measuring the right to discuss in public print the character and
conduct of one who is a public officer, or a candidate for public office, all
persons stand upon an equal plane. It matters not that one causing such
publication may be in the publishing business as a means of livelihood, or
for a less selfish purpose, while another committing the same act may be
engaged in some other pursuit. Neither may print or publish any matter
which falsely charges such person so in office, or a candidate, with the
commission of a crime without incurring a liability for the injury occasioned
thereby." This is the view of most American courts. See 53 C.J.S., Libel
and Slander § 121 (1948).
8 Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 306, 27 S.E.2d 837,
844 (1943).
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combine the utmost freedom in the performance of the
newspapers' function with the protection of society's rights.
II
PRIVATE LIBEL OR PUBLIC EXHORTATION
The most important safeguard is the determination of
the courts to draw a strict line between what is private
and what is public. So far as the newspaper is concerned,
this expresses itself in several ways. Even in states which,
like California, recognize the right of privacy, the right
ends when the interest of the public in the dissemination of
ideas is involved or a person's actions are of a public
character. In the domain of privacy, the publication of
what is of no public concern is an invasion of a right,
whether it affects the reputation of the individual or not.
The invasion of the right of privacy is an injury to a
person's feelings by having matters which are solely his
private concern exposed to the public. In the law of de-
famation, the courts have drawn the distinction between
private scandal and comments on the actions of public men
and matters of public concern and interest. A West
Virginia case has expressed the distinction in this manner:
The distinction between a statement with reference
to private gossip and scandal and one concerning an act
or conduct of public interest is so palpable as to require
no elucidation. Consideration of peace and order between
9 YANKWICH, IT'S LIBEL OR CONTEMPT IF YOU PRINT IT (1950), is an elabor-
ate discussion of these limitations. More recent developments have been
treated by Yankwich in numerous articles in legal publications. Among them
-ire: The Right of Privacy, 27 NoTRE DAME LAw. 499 (1952; The Protection if
Newspaper Comments on Public Men and Public Matters, 11 LA. L. REv. 327
(1951); The Law of Defamation and Privacy as a Restraint on Expression
and Creation, THE ARTs, PUBLISHING AND THE LAw, 117 (Conf. Series No. 10,
U. of Chi. Law School) (1952); Certainty in the Law of Defamation, 1
U.C.L.A. L. RPv. 163 (1954); Recent Developments in the Law of Creation,
Expression and Communication of Ideas, 48 N. W. LAw REv. 453 (1954);
Trends in the Law of Media of Communication, 15 F.R.D. 291 (1954).
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individuals calls for repression and punishment of false
and defamatory statements of fact concerning the private
person. There are equally cogent reasons for liberality
of statement in matters of public concern. A citizen of a
free state having an interest in the conduct of the affairs
of his government should not be held to strict account-
ability for misstatement of fact, if he has tried to
ascertain the truth, and, on a reasonable basis, honestly
and in good faith believes that the statements made by
him are true.10
In that case, the court held that an article on a member of
the state road commission which commented critically on
the price at which a bridge had been constructed was
within the range of fair comment on the acts of a public
official.
Almost identical language has been used in California:
Publications by which it is sought to convey pertinent
information to the public in matters of public interest
are permitted wide latitude. In controversies of a
political nature, in particular, the circumstances often
relieve statements, which might otherwise be actionable,
of possible defamatory imputations. Mere expressions of
opinion or severe criticism are not libelous if they clearly
go only to the merits or demerits of a condition, cause
or controversy which is under public scrutiny, even
though they may adversely reflect upon the public activi-
ties or fitness for office of individuals who are intimately
connected with the principal object of the attack.3-
(Emphasis added)
The doctrine is not new. For it has been the law of Cali-
fornia even before the application of the rule of qualified
privilege to the comments on public men and public
matters' and certainly since then, that criticism of the
manner in which one performs a public office is not
libelous. 3 Nor is it libelous to charge one with unfitness
10 Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 306, 27 S.E.2d 837,
844 (1943).
3-1 Howard v. Assoc. Newspapers, 95 Cal. App.2d 580, 584 (1950).
12 Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921).
13 Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal. App. 324 (1928).
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for office.' 4
Back of these decisions is the thought constantly fol-
lowed by many courts in the land: that matters of public
concern are the legitimate objects of a citizen's comment.
Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrotf "n an old case:
For apart from the question whether attributing to the
plaintiff conduct that was lawful, as the plaintiff says,
could be a libel . . . he was a public officer in whose
course of action connected with his office the citizens
of Puerto Rico had a serious interest, and anything
bearing on such action was a legitimate subject of state-
ment and- comment.:15 (Emphasis added)
In the case in which this was written, the article referred
to the fact that a certain person while United States
Attorney, carried on a private law practice and the conduct
was characterized as "a monstrous immorality", "a scan-
dal", etc.
While some of the cases are grounded upon the right
of fair comment, others are based on the distinction which
courts make between words written of a person in his
private capacity and those concerning one in his public
capacity or activities. Under either criterion, words which
if spoken of a man's action in a public capacity would be
considered not libelous or fair comment, may be held to
be libelous when spoken of a person in his private capacity.
Hence the distinction between exhorting the public to
action and disseminating private scandal. Denunciation
may be resorted to with impunity in the former, but not
in the latter.
14 Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381 (1933); Howard v. Assoc. News-
papers, 95 Cal. App.2d 580, 584 (1950).
15 Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452, 457 (1912). See Noel, Defamation of
Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COL. L. REv. 875 (1949).
16 Aldrich v. Boyle, 328 Mass. 30, 101 N.E.2d 495, 496 (1951).
.7 Sullivan v. Meyer, 91 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1937). See Rutherford v.
Dougherty, 91 F,2d 707 (3d Cir. 1937).
18 Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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III
DEFAMATION OF PERSONS IN PRIVATE CAPACITY
The contrast between the two approaches may be illus-
trated by references to other cases. Thus, in Massachusetts,
which does not recognize the liberal rule of privilege, a
statement that a councilman had acted in his own interest
was held not to be defamatory. This ruling rests on these
significant reasons:
We do not see how the advertisement, published as it
was in the course of a political campaign could injure the
plaintiff's reputation in the community or expose him
to hatred, ridicule, and contempt .... We think that the
advertisement, read as a whole and reasonably in-
terpreted, would not discredit the plaintiff in the minds
of a considerable and respectable class of the community.
Rightly understood, it is the customary type of hortatory
appeal commonly made to voters at election time.16
(Emphasis added)
This ruling accords with others made elsewhere in which
a person's attitude towards public questions is made the
suujoct of criticism.' 7 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has given .expression to the philosophy be-
hind such decisions in language which is worth quoting:
Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports
of the political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete
doctrine that the governed must not criticize their gover-
nors .... The interest of the public here outweighs the
interest of appellant or any other individual. The protec-
tion of the public requires not merely discussion but
information. Political conduct and views which some
respectable people approve, and others condemn, are
constantly imputed to Congressmen. Errors of fact,
particularly in regard to a man's mental states and
processes, are inevitable. Information and discussion will
be discouraged, and the public interest in public knowl-
edge of important facts will be poorly defended, if
error subjects its author to a libel suit without even a
showing of economic loss. Whatever is added to the field
of libel is taken from the field of free debate.18
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By contrast, the same court, in dealing with an article
concerning a physician who sought appointment to the
staff of a sanatorium, which commented on his "suave"
manners, and characterized him as one "whose social
graces have won him many feminine clients" held that
the article reflected upon his integrity saying:
We think that any average reader would gain the im-
pression from this series of articles that the plaintiff was
a fake, in the sense that he promoted himself by political
sponsorship and personal charm, rather than'by profes-
sional ability. The publications, read in the light of the
average reader's understanding, undoubtedly were calcu-
lated to damage the plaintiff's professional standing.' 9
In contrasting the right not to have one's reputation en-
dangered with the right to inform the public, Judge Ben-
nett Champ Clark wrote:
The duty to inform the public and the right to make a
'fair comment' ought not be so interpreted as to prejudice
the individual's rights to protect himself in the courts
when he is attacked. The least that the paper should be
called upon to do is come in and defend itself on the
merits, when it has published inherently damaging
materials. This is no burden on the 'freedom of the press',
it simply calls upon the press to exercise some care in
discharging its responsibility to the entire public -
individuals and mass alike.20
Another court of appeals interpreting South Carolina
law held that an almost innocuous statement that a person
had been forcibly ejected from a party committee meeting
presented a question of fact to the jury as to whether
injury of reputation would flow from it, saying:
It was, as a matter of fact, a question within the
province of the jury to decide whether the statements in
question - to the effect that plaintiff was forcibly
ejected (or forcibly kicked out) from the meeting of the
Committee by police called by Committeeman Gerald -
19 De Savitsch v. Patterson, 159 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
20 Id. at 17.
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were or were not defamatory and actionable as tending
to reduce plaintiff's character or reputation, to render
him odious, contemptible or ridiculous, or diminish his
reputation in his profession. We cannot say, as a matter
of law, that the publications in question did not tend to
bring about at least one of these effects. It is not neces-
sary that the publication directly charge the commission
of a crime or even precisely imply moral obliquity in
order to be defamatory and actionable. The test is how
the words in the publication may normally be understood
by third persons.
21
IV
FAIR COMMENT
In adopting a policy favorable to greater freedom of
comment on matters of public interest, the courts do not
follow a consistent pattern. Some achieve the result by
merely narrowing a statutory definition of libel which
they are called upon to interpret. Others resort to the
doctrine of fair comment first promulgated in England
which protects a fair expression of honest opinion which
does not go beyond what the particular facts and circum-
stances warrant. In order to achieve this result the com-
ment must satisfy these conditions:
(1) It must relate to a matter of public interest.
(2) It must relate not to a person, but to his acts.
Hence, it must not contain imputations of
corrupt or dishonorable motives on the per-
son whose conduct or work is criticized, save
in so far as such imputations are warranted
by the facts.
(3) It must be based on facts truly stated.
(4) It must be the honest expression of the
writer's real opinion on the facts which ap-
pear in the publication.
21 Hartzog v. United Press Ass'ns, 202 F.2d 81, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1953).
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Fair comment is essentially opinion based on facts. It
protects the comments of a writer on plays, works of
literature or art, schemes of improvement, governmental
measures, and the like.22
An old Kansas case has stated the matter, so far as it
applies to public performances, in this manner:
One who goes upon the stage to exhibit himself to the
public, or who gives any kind of a performance to which
the public is invited, may be freely criticized. He may be
held up to ridicule, and entire freedom of expression is
guaranteed dramatic critics, provided they are not
actuated by malice or evil purpose in what they write.
Fitting strictures, sarcasm, or ridicule, even, may be
used, if based on facts, without liability, in the absence
of malice or wicked purpose. The comments, however,
must be based on truth, or on what in good faith and
upon probable cause is believed to be true, and the
matter must be pertinent to the conduct that is made the
subject of criticism.23
The difficulty in the application of the principle, especially
when we deal not with performers, actors or the like, but
with public men whether they are in or out of office, is to
draw a true distinction between fact and comment. A
distinguished writer thirty-five years ago adverted to these
difnrculties:
The difficulty is that these decisions have generally
gone beyond the actual issue, and, often using the term
'criticism' as synonymous with derogatory statements of
fact, have expressed the dictum that criticism is privi-
leged, or not actionable, so long as it does not attack the
private character of the person criticized, or impute evil
motives. In other words, while the actual decision is gen-
22 See Yankwich, The Protection of Newspaper Comments on Public Men
and Public Matters, 11 LA. L. REV. 327, 338-340 (1951); GATLEY ON LiBEL
AsW SLANDER 335, 369 (4th ed. 1953); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606-609 (1938);
Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Brewer v. Hearst Pub. Co.,
185 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1950). The reason for fair comment was stated by
Scott, L.J. in Lyon v. Daily Telegraph, 1 K.B. 746, 752 (1943) as follows:
"The right of fair comment is one of the fundamental rights of free speech
and writing which are so dear to the British nation, and it is of vital
importance to the rule of law on which we depend for our personal freedom."
[Vol. XXX
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erally unimpeachable, the foundation is delusive, i.e., a
distinction between comment and statement of fact.
While this doctrine recognizes some latitude in the
discussion of matters of public interest, its practical
futility is shown by the conflicting and sometimes fanciful
ideas of the sort of imputations which are held to fall
within it. But this doctrine, so far as it is intelligible,
would seem to leave little, if any, more practical freedom
in the discussion of the conduct of a private person. It
leaves the law very much in the attitude of saying,
'You have full liberty of discussion, provided, however,
you say nothing that counts.2 (Emphasis added)
An old Australian case, often cited, seems to express the
true basis of differentiation:
The error which is usually committed by those who
bring themselves within the law of libel when com-
23 Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901). The
article contained this rather vigorous comment on three vaudevillians known
as the Cherry Sisters: "Billy Hamilton, of the Odebolt Chronicle, gives the
Cherry Sisters the following graphic write-up on their late appearance
in his town: 'Effie is an old jade of 50 summers, Jessie a frisky filly of 40,
and Addie, the flower of the family, a capering monstrosity of 35. Their
long skinny arms, equipped with talons at the extremities, swung mech-
anically, and anon waived frantically at the suffering audience. The mouths
of their rancid features opened like caverns, and sounds like the wailings
of damned souls issued therefrom. They pranced around the stage with a
motion that suggested a cross between the danse du ventre and fox trot -
strange creatures with painted faces and hideous mien. Effie is spavined,
Addie is stringhalt, and Jessie, the only one who showed her stockings,
has legs with calves as classic in their outline as the curves of a broom
handle.'" And see, Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio
116, 95 N.E. 735 (1911) (comment on acting); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing
Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930) (comment on football coach); Cohen
v. Cowles Pub. Co .... Wash. .... ., 273 P.2d 893 (1954) (comment on
horse race and conduct of jockey). On the whole subject, see GATLEY ON
LIEL AND SLANDER 362-366 (4th ed. 1953).
24 Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HAav. L. REv. 412, 432-433
(1910). The writer's comment is aptly illustrated by the following language
in the old California case of Tanner v. Embree, 9 Cal. App. 481, 484 (1908),
now repudiated: "The law tolerates public criticism of such officer or
candidate in so far as his moral delinquencies so made public may affect
his official character or fitness to assume the public duties to which he
aspires, upon the theory that the general public is entitled to know the
truth that they may intelligently exercise the elective franchise, or, in the
case of a public officer, be advised of the manner in which those in office are
discharging the duties of their trust. But in assuming to discuss in print
the private character of such candidate or officer one may not publish any
matter false in fact."
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menting on conduct is in thinking that they are com-
menting when in point of fact they are misdescribing.
Real comment is merely the expression of opinion. Mis-
description is matter of fact. If the misdescription is such
an unfaithful representation of a person's conduct as to
induce people to think that he had done something dis-
honourable, disgraceful, or contemptible, it is clearly
libelous. To state accurately what a man has done, and
then to say that in your opinion such conduct is dishon-
ourable or disgraceful, is comment which may do no
harm, as every one can judge for himself whether the
opinion expressed is well-founded or not. Misdescription
of conduct, on the other hand, only leads to the one con-
clusion detrimental to the person whose conduct is mis-
described, and leaves the reader no opportunity for
judging for himself the character of the conduct con-
demned, nothing but a false picture being presented for
judgment.25
The matter before the court was a card concerning a can-
didate for public office circulated by another candidate in
which it was charged that there had been a "dishonorable
use of another's name" by the candidate and that he had
admitted that fact. The court held that this was not fair
comment because the plaintiff's conduct had been mis-
described, using the language quoted, and asserting that
misdescription of what occurred is not fair comment. When
this distinction is observed, the difficulties inherent in con-
forming to the doctrine are minimized, but they do not
2 Christie v. Robertson, 10 N.S.W. St. R. 157, 161 (1889) per Windeyer, J.
This quotation is adopted with approval in De Savitsch v. Patterson, supra
note 19. The same Judge Windeyer gave a succinct statement of the elements
which make up fair comment in Christie v. Robertson, at 161: "The law
regards as fair comment or criticism all that a fair-minded man would
think it right and just to say either of a literary work or of the action of a
person whose conduct is open to criticism. Anything which goes beyond
this is libellous. The question, therefore, in every case of comment or
criticism is whether the language used exceeds the limits within which
anyone meaning to deal fairly with the person criticized would feel bound
to confine himself." Misstatement of facts does not destroy "fair comment".
PRossER oN TORTS, § 94, pp. 839-840 (1941); Note, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1207
(1949); Boyer, Fair Comment, 15 OHio ST. L. J. 280-302 (1954). See Golden
North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Pub. Co., 217 F.2d ... ., (9th Cir. 1954)
decided Dec. 10, 1954 and not yet reported in the advance sheets (comment
on inadequacy of airplane service in Alaska).
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altogether disappear. A more desirable result is reached
when we apply to publications relating to public men and
public matters the doctrine of qualified privilege as is done
in California and in a few other states.2"
V
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
The doctrine of qualified privilege applies to a variety of
relationships. The California statute which may be used
as an illustration, declares qualifiedly privileged publica-
tions made upon the following occasions:
(1) In a communication, without malice, to a
person interested therein, by one who is also
interested, or by one who stands in such rela-
tion to the person interested as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing the motive
for the communication innocent, or who is
requested by the person interested to give
the information;
(2) By a fair and true report, without malice, in
a public journal, of a judicial, legislative, or
other public official proceeding, or of any-
thing said in the course thereof, or of a veri-
fied charge or complaint made by any person
to a public official, upon which complaint a
warrant shall have been issued;
(3) By a fair and true report, without malice, of
the proceedings of a public meeting if such
meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful
purpose and open to the public, or the pub-
lication thereof was for the public benefit.27
26 Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoL. L. REV.
875, 903 (1949).
27 cAL. crv. coDE § 47 (3), (4) and (5) (1949). This is also the rule
elsewhere. See 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander §§ 90-97 (1948).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
A. Public Meetings
The qualified privilege of communications by and to per-
sons interested and of reports of judicial, legislative and
other public official proceedings has existed for a long time,
and almost universally in all our commonwealths.
The privileged character of communications addressed
by one interested to another who is also interested has been
applied to a variety of situations. In the older decisions, the
privilege was limited to close members of the family, or
members of the same church or lodge, as will appear fur-
ther on in the discussion. But with the broadening of rela-
tionships in a complex society, it became apparent that there
might be other relationships which imposed obligations to
disclose information under the protection of privilege. So
the privilege exists in the case of persons engaged in a labor
dispute;' persons sponsoring the recall of a public official;2'
the father of children presenting to a local Chamber of Com-
merce a resolution concerning the conduct of a teacher;"0
statements in a war community concerning a residence
which was alleged to have been a disorderly house; " a
statement by a physician disclosing the report of a labora-
tory which stated that a person had a venereal disease.32
The qualified privilege attaching to reports of public
meetings is not so widespread. Such a provision was en-
acted in England in 1888, as a part of the Law of Libel
Amendment Act.33 The principle embodied therein is in
derogation of the Common Law under which privilege at-
28 Emde v. Labor Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943); Freeman v.
Mills, 97 Cal. App.2d 161, 166-167, 217 P.2d 687 (1950). See Annotations,
Communication Between Members of Family, 78 A.L.R. 1182 (1932); Defama-
tion -of One Relative to Another by Person not Related to Either, 25 A.L.R.
2d 1388 (1952).
29 Gunsul v. Ray, 6 Cal. App.2d 528, 45 P.2d 248 (1935).
30 Heuer v. Kee, 15 Cal. App.2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
3' Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App.2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
32 Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App.2d 911, 183 P.2d 318 (1947).
33 51 & 52 VICT. c. 64 (1888).
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tached only to reports of judicial and parliamentary pro-
ceedings.34
Under this provision, the following conditions must con-
cur before privilege attaches:
(1) There must have been a public meeting, con-
vened for a lawful purpose and open to the
public;
(2) The reports must be fair and accurate;
(3) The matter must be of public concern or the
publication thereof for the public benefit.
To be fair and accurate the report need not be verbatim.
A fair summary of the proceedings is sufficient. Slight in-
accuracies will not deprive a report of the privilege if it be,
as a whole, a substantially fair and correct account of what
took place at the meeting.35
The negative side of the principle may be stated as fol-
lows: In order that an article be considered a fair and true
report of a public meeting:
(1) It should not contain any derogatory state-
ments which were not uttered at the meeting;
(2) It should not contain any addition of extrin-
sic libelous matter which amounts to an accu-
sation or declaration that the charges made
at such meeting were true;
(3) Nor should it contain comment which as-
sumes the guilt of the person referred to in
the meeting.
Under the English provision, as interpreted by the
courts, it is not sufficient that the meeting be for the pub-
licpenefit, and the proceedings and speeches, on the whole,
also for public benefit. It must also be proved that the pub-
34 GATLEY ON LIBEL A&D SLANDER 326-331 (4th ed. 1953); NmwELL, SLANDER
Am LiBEL §§ 468-473 (4th ed. 1924).
35 Gatley, op. cit. supra note 34, at 327-328. FRAsER oN LIBEL AND SLANDER
140-146 (7th ed. 1936).
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lication of the particular matter complained of was for the
public benefit.36
The California provision is broader and the requirement
that the publication of the matter complained of be for the
public benefit is an alternative one. The privilege would
seem to attach to reports of meetings provided they are pub-
lic, whether their proceedings or speeches be for the public
benefit or not. More, if the publication of the matter be for
the public benefit, the privilege would attach even though
some of the requirements as to the nature of the public
meeting (such as the lawfulness of its purposes) be absent.
B. Other Public Proceedings
The principles by which is determined the fairness of re-
ports of judicial, legislative and other public official pro-
ceedings are, generally, the same as those by which are
judged the reports of public meetings.
Fairness is absent when the report contains fragmentary,
incomplete parts of the proceedings which do not indicate
a fair summary of the whole thereof.3" In this respect, how-
ever, the court overlooks unimportant inaccuracy. It does
not require perfection of the reporter and will grant him
the full benefit of the privilege if his report is substantially
accurate.
As said by a California court:
It is not the mere fact that a difference exists between
the published report of what the complaint in the pro-
ceeding charged and what was actually alleged in the
complaint, but rather is the difference of a substantial
character and does it produce a different effect. It seems
clear that the published article was a fair and sub-
stantial account of the complaint written by a reporter
36 Gatley, op. cit. supra note 34, at 329. Kelly v. O'Malley, 6 T.LR. 248
(1889); Sharman v. Merritt, 32 TZ..R. 360 (1916).
37 People v. Gordan, 63 Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (1923).
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and finally published without any unusual circumstances
obtaining.38
The addition of facts which did not occur or comments
or inferences drawing libelous conclusions from the facts-
such as, in the case of the publication of the fact that a per-
son had been arrested and upon what charge, comment im-
plying guilt - destroys the privilege. Any such comment is
considered "excessive publication." 9
VI
THE PRIVILEGE OF REPORTS OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
The question has often arisen whether pleadings or com-
plaints filed in the office of a county clerk or court clerk and
which have not yet been read in open court or been the sub-
ject of some judicial act - are qualifiedly privileged.
Generally, courts have made a distinction between a
complaint and a judicial proceeding. The older cases even
went so far as to hold that the qualified privilege of publi-
cation applied only to proceedings on the merits (hearings
in open court). But this rule has been modified and the
privilege now attaches to reports of ex parte and prelimin-
ary proceedings.
This rule will render privileged a fair report of the
38 Kurata v. Los Angeles News Pub. Co., 4 Cal. App.2d 224, 228, 40 P.2d
520 (1935).
39 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 97 (1948); Moore v. Dispatch Printing
Co., 87 Mim. 450, 92 N.W. 396 (1902); Atlanta News Pub. Co. v. Medlock, 123
Ga. 714, 51 S.E. 756 (1905); Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 195 Cal. 165, 196
Pac. 57 (1921); Lyon v. Fairweather, 63 Cal. App. 194, 218 Pac. 477 (1923);
Norfolk Post Corp. v. Wright, 140 Va. 735, 125 S.E. 656 (1924); Wiley v.
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224 (1924); Campbell v.
New York Eve. Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 152 (1927); Hubbard v. Assoc.
Press, 123 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1941); Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App.2d 649, 661,
171 P.2d 118 (1946); Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947).
Annotation, Libel by Headline, 40 A..R. 583 (1926). See 53 C.J.S., Libel
and Slander § 121 (1948) (Newspapers and News).
40 Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112 N.W. 358 (1907).
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charges made in a bill of equity which has been presented
to the court, and upon which the court has acted by mak-
ing an order that the defendants appear and show cause
why an injunction should not be issued against them. 1 So
that, taking the court action to which publicity is mostly
given - that of divorce - the issuance of an order to show
cause re alimony makes the publication of the contents of
the complaint qualifiedly privileged.
However, I am of the view that in California the privilege
of publication attaches the moment the pleading is filed in
the office of the clerk. My reasons are these:
The filing of a complaint is a part of a judicial proceed-
ing (the first step therein) 42 or of a "public official proceed-
ing, 43 and the subsequent pleadings are successive steps
therein. Under Section 1888 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, pleadings, when filed, become public writings.
By Section 1892 of the California Political Code, "the
public records and other matters in the office of any officer,
are at all times, during office hours, open to inspection of
any citizen of this state." This right may be enforced by a
writ of mandate.'
The right of a citizen to inspect and take a copy of a pub-
lic writing - the right, in other words, of familiarizing
himself with the contents thereof - implies the right to
make the contents known to others. When made public,
41 Metcalf v. Times Pub. Co., 20 R.I. 674, 78 Am. St. Rep. 900 (1898);
Lundin v. Post Pub. Co., 217 Mass. 213, 104 N.E. 480 (1914); Thompson v.
Boston Pub. Co., 285 Mass. 344, 189 N.E. 210 (1934); Sanford v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5 (1945); Annotations,
Privilege of Pleadings, 52 A.L.R. 1438 (1928); 104 A.L.R. 1124 (1936).
42 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 405 (1953).
43 CAL. Crv. CODE §47 (4) (1949).
44 Coldwell v. Bd. Of Public Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 Pac. 879 (1921);
q-- Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156, 161, 238 P.2d 581 (1951).
45 Campbell v. New York Eve. Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153 (1937).
Other courts are now taking the same view: Fitch v. Daily News Pub. Co.,
116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947 (1928); Lybrand v. The State Co., 179 S.C. 208,
184 S.E. 580 (1936).
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they lose their private confidential character. "What one
may lawfully speak, he may lawfully write and publish."45
Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals of
New York, under similar statutes, have so held.4"
A New York woman brought suit against a newspaper
for the publication of a news item which referred to the fact
that a summons had been served against her and reciting
the alleged facts in the case. Before the complaint was filed,
the proposed suit was settled out of court. The woman sued
for libel, contending that the publication was untrue, that
it was false to say that she had been sued when only sum-
moned and that the publication of news concerning the is-
suance of a summons was not privileged. The court of ap-
peals said that "A lawsuit, from beginning to end, is in the
nature of a judicial proceeding."
Because the New York statutes make any paper filed in
the County Clerk's office, excepting pleadings in actions
for divorce, public property, subject to inspection and ex-
amination at all times and because the New York Practice
Act defines, in Section 4, an action in almost the identical
language of the California Code,47 the ruling of the two
highest courts of New York should be determinative of the
question.
An additional reason exists with us in California. In New
York, an action is begun by the service of the summons,
with or without a complaint. With us, an action is com-
menced by filing of a complaint, in all cases except in con-
demnation proceedings.48
46 Campbell v. New York Eve. Post, 219 App. Div. 169, 218 N.Y. Supp. 446
(1926). See the interesting comment on the New York Court of Appeals
decision by Cardozo, the then Chief Judge of that court, in his TBE PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAL SciENcE 23-24 (1928).
47 CAL. CODE civ. PROC. § 22 (1953).
48 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 405 and 1243 (1953). Indicative of a liberal
trend is the fact that the report of a grand jury returned without an indict-
ment was held privileged: Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292
(1933). As to the privileged character of affidavits see Donnell v. Linforth,
11 Cal. App.2d 25, 52 P.2d 937 (1935).
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VII
THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF PUBLICATIONS IN
DISCHARGE OF DUTY
The qualified privilege of communications by and to per-
sons interested covers a multitude of relationships. They
include, generally, communications between interested
parties and parties between whom a confidential relation
exists, and communications the object of which is to pro-
tect private interests. They also include communications
made in discharge of duty. The duty need not be one bind-
ing at law: It includes moral and social duties. The cases
already discussed indicate the broadening scope in inter-
preting these duties.
By the ruling of the supreme court in Snively v. Record
Publishing Co.,49 the mantle of qualified privilege has been
thrown over newspaper comments on the acts and conduct
of public officials. Such comments, even though false, even
though amounting to a charge of crime or corruption, are
privileged if published without express malice (with be-
lief in their truth).
49 Snirely v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921). In addition
to Califoraia, the rule seems to obtain in Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Dakota and West Virginia:
Connor v. Timothy, 43 Ariz. 517, 33 P.2d 293 (1934); Coleman v. McLennon,
78 Kan. 7 U1, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Cooper v. Romney, 49 Mont. 119, 141 Pac.
289 (1941); Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919); McLean v.
Merriman, 42 S.D. 294, 175 N.W. 878 (1920); Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa
873, 191 N.W. 167, 174 (1922); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 AUt. 92
(1923); Steenson v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 P.2d 907 (1936); Clancy v.
Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938); Bailey v. Charleston
Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943). In Connor v. Timothy,
supra, the court stated, 33 P.2d at 295: "It is urged by defendant that this
communication was privileged because it was a statement made in the
course of an election. It is true that statements respecting political affairs,
public officers, and candidates for office are in a measure privileged, for
one who seeks public office waives his right of privacy, so that he cannot
object to any proper investigation into the conduct of his private life which
will throw light on the question as to whether the public, which bestows
upon him the office which he seeks, shall elect him or not, and a charge
made in good faith against such candidate which affects his fitness for the
office which he seeks is privileged, even though untrue."
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The full import of this decision cannot be understood
without some comment on the state of the law prior to its
rendition. Our courts had repeatedly refused to recognize
that a newspaper published (as a citizen) has a qualified
privilege to comment on the acts and conduct of public
officials. So much so that there had grown up a phrase
which was used every time the question of newspaper priv-
ilege was brought up, namely, "A lie is never privileged."
While this expression does not actually occur in the cases
which the Snively case overrules, they contain its equiva-
lent. "One can justify," said the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, "the publication of a libel against a candidate for
office upon privilege, only by proof that the accusation is
true."50
"One cannot," echoed one of our appellate courts, "es-
cape responsibility for a falsehood under the claim of privi-
lege." 53
The challenge to this principle was this: A lie is privi-
leged if told on a privileged occasion, without malice. If this
were not so, and if truth were the only defense to civil libel,
the doctrine of privileged publications might as well be
abandoned.
One does not need the protection of privilege to tell the
truth. To use a homely illustration: One needs an umbrella
when and where it rains. When it is not raining or when one
is under shelter one does not need an umbrella. The pro-
tection of privilege is needed when the libeler has not truth
on his side.
In the Snively case, the Supreme Court of California, fol-
lowing the intimation it had given in denying a hearing in
Adams v. Cameron,52 repudiated its prior doctrine. This de-
50 Dauphiny v. Buhne, 153 Cal. 757, 96 Pac. 880 (1908); Jarman v. Rea,
137 Cal. 339, 70 Pac. 216 (1902).
53 Adams v. Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625, 150 Pac. 1005 (1915).
52 Id.
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cision determines that newspaper comments on the acts and
conduct of public officials are qualifiedly privileged and
that mere falsity will not destroy the privilege.
The principles so declared flow from the very wording
of the California statutory definition of libel. The words
"false and unprivileged" are used therein. Now, if mere
falsity is enough, why should our code makers have added
"unprivileged" conjunctively? Again, if mere falsity de-
stroys the qualified privilege created by subdivision 3 of
Section 47 of the Civil Code, why call it "privilege" at all?
Since the promulgation of the doctrine, the courts have
given it a latitudinarian interpretation with the result that
it has been extended to a large variety of publications which
charged the unfitness of candidates for or occupants of pub-
lic office. Indeed, the courts seem to have gone further and
held that such a charge, if it contains no imputation of cor-
ruption in office, is not even libel.
fliustrative are: The statement that the members of a
city council "lacked the conscientious regard for the city's
interest which makes the public office a public trust," and
urging their recall; 53 a publication impugning the motive of
a mayor and attributing his attitude towards a certain or-
dinance to selfish motives and his aspirations to Con-
gress; 54 a statement impugning the motives of a member
of a school board in opposing the establishment of student
savings bank; " a questioning of the sources of the wealth
which had been accumulated in public office while work-
ing on a small salary without making any intimation that
it was acquired illegally; 6 a charge that certain members
53 Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 22 P.2d 569 (1933).
54 Morcom v. San Francisco Shopping News, 4 Cal. App.2d 284, 40 P.2d
940 (1935).
55 Harris v. Curtis Pub. Co., 49 Cal. App.2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942).
56 Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App.2d 528, 186 P.2d 737
(1942).
57 Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal. App. 324, 264 Pac. 803 (1928).
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of a city council "have neither the zeal nor the temperament
to administer the business of the city";"7 a letter criticizing
a group connected with a recall election, calling the recall
movement "illegitimate, a sinister movement" referring
to the committee as a "disgrace" and as a "dangerous and
unju st element.' '5 8
Notwithstanding this trend, when the courts are deal-
ing with persons in their private capacity, the definition of
libel is broadened so as to include almost any charge which
reflects on a person's character. This is especially true when
the charge is of a character that tends to injure him in his
occupation. Thus, an accusation that a person is engaged in
espionage as a member of the American Embassy is a li-
bel.59 So is a charge that a member of a labor organization
is a "demagogue" and "would-be dictator.""0 A communi-
cation that a jockey was guilty of unethical practices and
the type of individual "who might readily have been in-
volved in furnishing batteries to jockeys" is libelous, al-
though privileged when circulated solely among members
of an association."'
The upshot of the matter is that, despite the liberaliza-
tion of the rules in California and other states as they af-
fect persons in public life and matters of public interest,
the newspaper man must still tread cautiously if he is to
exercise competently and with responsibility the right to
comment on matters of public concern. After all, the privi-
lege is not absolute but qualified. It can be lost by over-
publication or excessive publication and by malice.
VIII
PRIVILEGE AND MALICE
Malice in fact (or express malice) destroys qualified
privilege of whatever character. In each case (communica-
tions by or to interested persons, reports of judicial, legis-
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lative or other public proceedings, or reports of public meet-
ings) the privilege is dependent upon the absence of malice
58 Howard v. Assoc. Newspapers, 95 Cal. App.2d 580 (1950). Recent
decisions elsewhere in states which do not recognize the liberal rule of
privilege are equally generous. Thus, a statement that the brother of a
governor was in charge of patronage could not be turned into a charge of
soliciting and receiving bribes (Tobin v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,
324 Mass. 478, 87 N.E.2d 116 (1949) ); a charge that a councilman had voted
for his own personal interest (Aldrich v. Boyle, 328 Mass. 30, 101 N.E.2d 495
(1951) ); that a magistrate running for re-election did not make monthly
reports until forced to do so (Piacenti v. Williams Press, 347 Ill. App. 440,
107 N.E.2d 45 (1952) ); attributing financial motive, the desire for two
retirement pensions to a candidate for public office (Poland v. Post Pub. Co.,
116 N.E.2d 860 (1953) ); attacking limited business experience of candidate
for auditor by reflecting on her management of father's estate and stating
that it had $50,000 in debts outstanding (Tiernan v. East Shore Newspapers,
1 Ill. App.2d 150, 116 N.E.2d 896, 898-899 (1953) ). The case last cited uses
language which, while not adopting the doctrine of qualified privilege,
nevertheless goes about as far as any American case on fair comment,
including Howard v. Assoc. Newspaper, supra, has gone: "Our Supreme
Court has determined that when anyone becomes a candidate for public
office, which is conferred by the vote of the people, he is considered as
putting his character in issue in so far as it may respect his fitness and
qualifications for the office, and everyone may freely comment on his
conduct and actions. His acts may be canvassed and his conduct boldly
censured.
"A number of cases have given considerable attention to criticisms sub-
stantially similar in nature and which have been potentially more deroga-
tory in nature, such as statements in a campaign for sheriff to the effect. 'It is
no wonder that these crooks are for him and boast that they will run the
county for the next four years.'... 'It may be conceded that the publications
do not charge appellant with the commission of any crime, nor with the
expression of principles subversive of government. . . . It is not libelous
per se to say that the defendant had done nothing in the enforcement of the
law, nor was it libelous per se to charge that thieves, burglars, bank robbers
. . . were supporting the candidate for sheriff and boasting that they would
run the county for the next four years because.... The law will presume
that their support was induced wholly by their preference for that candidate,
and may refer entirely to politics, and does not tend to show any criminal
connection nor impugn his honesty or integrity.' To make such publication
libelous per se, the Court indicated, '"The conduct charged must be of
such a nature as to reflect upon the character and integrity of the plaintiff
and to subject him to a loss of public confidence and respect; and a writing,
although charging wrongful conduct or dereliction of duty, is not libelous
per se, within the meaning of the rule, unless it imputes a dishonest or
fraudulent motive or interest."' Testing the present publication by such
cases it could not fairly be said that there was any charge of dishonesty
in the publication referred to. Certainly it is difficult to sustain any theory
upon which the publication could be deemed as libelous per se since nothing
specifically is charged in the language contained in the communication
which comes within the definition of such libels." But this broad rule will
not ordinarily be applied if the charge imputes "malfeasance in office".
(Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 101 A.2d 535, 538 (1953) ).
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in fact.62 Such malice in fact is not inferred from the com-
munication or publication.6" Nor is it ever presumed. And
by express malice is meant actual malice, the motive of per-
sonal spite or ill-will towards the plaintiff, the malice of
malevolence in the sense in which that word is used in the
well-known phrase from the Litany of the Church of Eng-
land, "from envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitable-
ness."
This malice is not to be confounded with malice in law
which is merely a "wrongful act, done intentionally, with-
out just cause or excuse."6"
Ultimately, however, malice, be it malice in law or malice
in fact, or, as it is variously called, actual or express malice,
has its being in the intentional doing of what is injurious
to another - of what the law denounces as a wrong.
Both are deduced from such an act, the one by implica-
tion made by law, i. e., by the court; the other by inference
made by the jury.6" In either case, the deduction is made
from the doing of an act injurious to another without just
cause - an act which is "connected with such circum-
stances as carry in them 'the plain indications of a heart re-
gardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief.' "6 In-
herently there is no difference between the two. The dif-
ference lies only in the manner of proof.
There is no malice in law (or implied malice) in the law
of civil libel in California. And the California Supreme
59 Pridinoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal2d 788 (1951).
60 Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, 107 Cal. App.2d 253 (1951).
G1 Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App.2d 161 (1950).
62 Gosewich v. Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 119 Pac. 656 (1911).
63 CAL. CrV. CODE § 48 (1949).
64 Maynard v. F.F. Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48 (1867). The trend in the same
direction in other states is quite evident. See Annotations, Doctrine of
Privilege as Applicable to Misstatements, 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937), 150 A.L.R.
358 (1944).
65 Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 Pac. 530 (1911).
66 United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,867 (1819).
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Court, while adopting the liberal rule of privilege, has re-
fused to apply to it the rule sanctioned by many courts to
qualifiedly privileged publications, that the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove actual malice.
On the contrary, its ruling is that privilege being a mat-
ter of defense, which, to be available, must be pleaded,67 the
burden is on the defendant who pleads the privilege to show
the absence of actual malice.6
Many cases hold that express malice must be proved by
evidence dehors the publication. 9 The California court
rules that such malice may be inferred by the jury from the
publication and the circumstances connected with it70 It
may be shown by legitimate inference from other facts and
circumstances," and by other publications of the same or
of different character. 2 So that, supposing a plea of privi-
lege is made, and evidence of want of malice is offered, it is
not difficult for the plaintiff to prove its existence.
67 Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 577, 198 Pac. 1 (1921); Stevens
v. Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 214 Pac. 968 (1923); Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 263
Pac. 812 (1928). But see Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal.2d 599, 602-603, 61 P.2d 922
(1936). For the view that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the exis-
tence of malice in fact, if the publication is qualifiedly privileged, see Cole-
man v. McLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Sowers v. Wells, 154
Kan. 134, 114 P.2d 828 (1941). Some cases even require proof of falsity. See
Cooper v. Romney, 49 Mont. 119, 141 Pac. 289 (1914).
68 Longsworth v. Curson, 56 Cal. App. 489, 206 Pac. 779 (1922). As to
proving privilege under a general denial see Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n,
126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
69 Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893); Somerville v.
Hawkins, 10 C.B. 583, 138 Eng. Rep. 231 (1851).
70 See note 48, supra. Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 213 Pac. 954 (1923).
See Hallen, Excessive Publication in Defamation, 16 MiNN. L. REv. 160-171
(1932).
71 Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 166, 116 Pac. 530 (1911).
72 Scoff v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 Cal. 345, 184 Pac. 672 (1919). As to the
respective provinces of court and jury in determining privilege and malice,
see Annotation, 26 A.L.R. 830 (1923).
73 See note 2, supra. Dauphiny v. Buhne, 153 Cal. 757, 763 (1908).
74 See Tanner v. Embree, 9 Cal. App. 481 (1908) (a constable "winking at
prostitution"); Dauphiny v. Buhne, supra note 72 (a councilman soliciting
trade in his grocery store from a franchise seeker).
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CONCLUSION
Little remains to be said by way of conclusion. It is quite
apparent that through the (1) tightening of the definition
of libel; (2) the application and extension of the law of fair
comment; and (3) the doctrine of qualified privilege ap-
plied to comments on public men and public matters, news-
papers can still influence public opinion effectively.
Even before the adoption of the liberal rule, courts con-
ceded the right to comment on a public man's "faults and
vices so far as they affect his official character.""3 But while
giving expression to these generalied principles, in reality,
they permitted no defense other than truth to any charge
of misconduct in relation to the office.' So the supposed
right of comment was illusory. At present, in states which,
like California, follow the liberal rule,75 the good faith of
the writer, his belief in the truth of his charges, the reli-
ability of his sources of information are shields which pro-
tect him in the performance of his public responsibility.
This can be done without resorting to slander, which in the
words of Pisanio:
* . . is sharper than the sword, whose tongue
Outvenoms all worms of Nile, whose breath
75 The scope and limitations of the liberal rule of privilege are well
stated in two old New Hampshire cases: Palmer v. Concord, 48 N.H. 211,
97 Am. Dec. 605, 611 (1868): "Conductors of the public press have no rights
but such as are common to all.... But in this country, every citizen has the
right to call the attention of his fellow-citizens to the maladministration of
public affairs, or the misconduct of public servants, if his real motive in so
doing is to bring about a reform of abuses, or to defeat the re-election or
reappointment of an incompetent officer." State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 31
Am. Dec 217, 220 (1837): "If the end to be attained is justifiable; as, if the
object is the removal of an incompetent officer, or to prevent the election of
an unsuitable person to office, or, generally, to give useful information to the
community, or to those who have a right and ought to know, in order that
they may act upon such information, the occasion is lawful, and the party
may then justify or excuse the publication.
"Where, however, there is merely color of a lawful occasion, and the
party, instead of acting in good faith, assumes to act for some justifiable end
merely as a pretense to publish and circulate defamatory matter, or for
other unlawful purpose, he is liable in the same manner as if such'pretense
had not been resorted to."
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Rides on the posting winds and doth belie
All corners of the world; Kings, queens and states
Maids, matrons, nay, the secrets of the grave
This viperous slander enters.7 6
And constitutional protection does not extend to defama-
tory words or "fighting words." As said by the Supreme
Court of the United States in a famous case: "Resort to epi-
thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense commu-
nication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Con-
stitution." 77 So there is no gain in joining the "noisy few."
To the contrary, there is always danger that those who
would restrict the public's right to know7' would use the
abuses of the irresponsible as an excuse for achieving in-
directly what cannot be done directly - control of the press,
under which no democratic society can exist.
Leon R. Yankwich*
76 Shakespeare, Cymbeline, Act HI sc. IV, lines 34-40.
77 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-310 (1940). See Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942) and Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 US. 250 (1952).
78 See CRoss, THE PEoPL's RIGHT TO KNOW (1953).
* Chief U.S. District Judge, Southern District of California.
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